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Abstract—One of the hardest tasks of a certification infrastruc-
ture is to manage revocation. This process consists in collecting
and making the revocation status of certificates available to users.
Research on this topic has focused on the trade-offs that different
revocation mechanisms offer. Much less effort has been conducted
to understand and model real-world revocation processes. For
this reason, in this paper, we present a novel analysis of real-
world collected revocation data and we propose a revocation
prediction model. The model uses an Autoregressive Integrated
Moving Average Model (ARIMA). Our prediction model enables
certification authorities to forecast the percentage of revoked
certificates.
Index Terms—Certification, PKI, Revocation, CRL, ARIMA.
I. INTRODUCTION
In a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), digital certificates are
the means of accurately and reliably distributing public keys to
users needing to encrypt messages or verify digital signatures.
Certificates are signed by certification authorities (CAs) and
they are issued with a planned lifetime, which is defined
through a validity start time and an explicit expiration date.
Once issued, a certificate becomes valid when its validity start
time is reached, and it is considered valid until its expiration
date. However, various circumstances may cause a certificate
to become invalid prior to the expiration of the validity period.
Such circumstances include requiring to change the name
of the subject of a certificate, the compromise or suspected
compromise of the private key associated to the certificate
and a change of association between subject and CA, for
example, when an employee terminates employment with
an organization. Thus, the PKI has to collect and distribute
information about revoked certificates.
There are several mechanisms to manage revocation in-
formation. Currently deployed PKIs rely mostly on Certifi-
cate Revocation Lists (CRLs) for handling certificate revoca-
tion [1]. A CRL is a list identifying revoked certificates, which
is signed by a CA and made available at a public distribution
point. The CRL has a validity period, and updated versions
of the CRL are published before the previous CRL’s validity
period expires. Each revoked certificate is identified in a CRL
by its certificate serial number. Typically, CAs automatically
issue new CRLs on a regular periodic basis (for example, daily,
weekly or monthly). Although CRL is the most widely used
mechanism to distribute certificate status information, there
have been proposed other mechanisms to make revocation
distribution more efficient (see Section II-A for further details).
The work presented in this paper is motivated by the
fact that despite there are many works in the literature that
propose and evaluate different mechanisms for distributing
revocation data like [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], little work
has been done for analyzing the revocation process itself.
For instance, many of the previous studies consider very
simplistic assumptions about the revocation process like that
the percentage of revoked certificates remains always constant.
Only recently, we can find works like [8], [9], [10] that carry
out statistical studies about the revocation process using data
available from real CAs. These studies can be considered a first
step towards understanding the revocation process. However,
they essentially just analyze the probability distribution of the
revocation process. In this paper, we go a step further and we
use time-series analysis to build a model and a predictor for
revocation. Using this novel way of exploring the revocation
data we are able to obtain a model that predicts extremely well
the weekly revocation percentage.
To build the model, we start performing a preliminary
analysis using revocation codes. Revocation codes are op-
tional parameters that can be included within revocation data.
When we tried to get some insights about the revocation
process using revocation codes, we found that each CA
uses the parameter applying different criteria. This is mainly
because the use of revocation codes is poorly specified by
standardization organisms. So, we cannot use the revocation
code as a parameter upon which to build our model. Thus,
we build a revocation model which is exclusively based
on temporal information, namely revocation dates and the
life-time of certificates. These parameters are well-defined
and compulsory. Using this information and the Box-Jenkins
methodology [11], we are able to build a model and a predictor
for revocation. More precisely, we are able to show that an
ARIMA (Autoregressive, Integrated, Moving Average) model
provides objective and accurate predictions of the incremental
percentage of weekly revoked certificates. To find the number
of significant coefficients and their corresponding values we
used Z-transforms and a vision of the problem based on digital
filters. This greatly simplified the overall process of finding the
model. The resulting model exploits autocorrelations, captures
the dependencies within the revocation data and simplifies
these complex relationships to linear dependencies.
Regarding the data used to build the model, we have to
mention that VeriSign is the only CA that makes the life-
time of certificates public. Since this parameter is necessary
to build the model, our ARIMA model is based only on
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data only belong to the leading certification authority1, the
model is expected to be valid for other certification providers
because of the huge amount of certificates analyzed and
because our model captures the general pattern of the temporal
correlation that exists among the revocation events. This
pattern is expected to be the same for other CAs because
the theoretical reasons to revoke certificates (and therefore the
temporal correlation) do not essentially differ, no matter which
certificate provider you use. As a final remark, we would like
to mention that our model might be interesting for several
reasons: on one hand, it provides some insights about the
revocation process, like showing that the process is highly
autocorrelated and, on the other hand, it allows CAs to make
predictions about certificate revocation. This might be useful
in some real scenarios (see Section VII).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
briefly reviews the required background. Section III presents
a preliminary analysis focused on the study of the revocation
causes. In Section IV, we discuss the methodology we used
to collect and analyze the revocation data. In Section V,
we identify the best ARIMA model that fits the revocation
events. Next, in section VI we present the predictor from
the previous ARIMA model. In Section VII we discuss some
possible practical applications of the revocation forecasting
model. Finally, we conclude in Section VIII.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Certificate Status Validation Mechanisms
In this section we briefly review the main approaches to
convey Certificate Status Information (CSI). The traditional
approach is to periodically publish a certificate revocation list
(CRL) [13], which is a list of all revoked certificates within
a domain. This list is signed by the CA itself, in order to
let end entities verify its authenticity. The main problem with
this approach is that the list can grow for large domains, and
the network load involved in all clients downloading the list
can become unacceptable. To minimize the network resources
needed to communicate them to the end entities, CRLs are
published frequently and timely when new revocations occur.
However, clients tend to download CRLs according to the
time established for an update. Therefore, end entities do not
possess fresh revocation information on a need-to-know basis.
Two solutions were proposed to deal with the CRLs’ prob-
lems [14]: Distribution Points and Delta-CRLs. Distribution
Points provide the means to partition a CRL. Delta-CRLs are
there to face the problem of using up too much of the available
network resources when communicating the CRL either as a
whole, or even in parts through Distribution Points. Delta-
CRLs provide the means for constructing incremental CRLs.
Whenever new revocations have taken place, the (new) CRL
that end entities will have to retrieve, will contain only the
new CSI.
Also to deal with the communication overhead of the
CRLs, Micali [15] proposed the Certificate Revocation Status
1VeriSign represents around half of the market according to [12].
(CRS). In CRS, a CA signs a fresh list of all not-yet-expired
certificates together with selected hash chain values. The
hash chain values can be used to verify whether the queried
certificate is valid or not for a certain time interval. The main
advantage of this mechanism is that it significantly reduces
the communication costs between the CSI repository and the
dependent entity, by employing a mechanism for the CSI
dissemination which contains positive statements regarding the
status of a certificate. Nevertheless, the main disadvantage of
this system is the increase of the CA’s communication cost
with the CSI repositories [16].
A different, also standardized approach is to provide an on-
line server and use protocols for obtaining on-line revocation
information. In this case, a client issues a request for every
encountered certificate instead of obtaining a full revocation
list. Hence, the online certificate status protocol (OCSP) [17]
allows end entities to query for CSI in a more timely fashion
than CRLs. OCSP can be used to provide timely CSI, and it
could be used in conjunction with CRLs.
The responses to CSI queries returned by OCSP are digitally
signed. The authority that runs the OCSP service can either
be the CA itself, or another entity designated by the CA
as a CSI provider (Trusted Responder or CA Designated
Responder). The CSI responses given by the authorities are
always signed to let requesters verify the authenticity of
the CSI. However, the signing of each OCSP response is a
computational overhead and it could facilitate Denial of Ser-
vice (DoS) attacks. Pre-computed responses that have a short
validity interval could be a solution to this problem. These
pre-signed OCSP responses are usually provided via SSL/TLS
authenticated channels. However, in case the transport protocol
is not authenticated, the authority that provides the OCSP
service is vulnerable against replay attacks, where someone
could replay OCSP responses before their expiration date but
after a certificate has been revoked.
Kocher [18] suggested another CSI mechanism, the Certifi-
cate Revocation Tree (CRT). A CRT is based on a Merkle
hash tree [19] containing certificate serial number ranges as
the tree leaves. The root of the hash tree is signed by the CA.
Now, the certificate status proof for a certificate with serial
number s consists of the path node siblings from the root
to the appropriate leaf (having s in its range), in addition to
the signature on the root of the tree. Thus, If n certificates
are currently revoked, the length of the proof is O(log n). In
contrast, the length of the validity proof in OCSP is O(1).
B. Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) Pro-
cesses
Prediction of scalar time series refers to the task of finding
estimate of next future sample sˆ(n) based on the knowledge
of the history of time series, i.e. samples s(n− 1), s(n− 2),
etc. Many time series can be suitably forecast using linear
techniques as the Auto Regressive Integrated Moving Average
(ARIMA) model popularized by Box and Jenkins [11]. In this
paper we show that the revocation probability can be suitably
forecast using an ARIMA process.
The ARIMA approach to forecasting is based on the fol-
lowing ideas: the forecasts are based on linear functions of
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models that provide an adequate description of the observed
data. Each ARIMA process has three parts: the autoregressive
(or AR) part; the integrated (or I) part; and the moving average
(or MA) part. The models are often written in shorthand as
ARIMA(p, d, q) where p describes the AR part, d describes
the integrated part and q describes the MA part.
• Auto Regressive. This part of the model describes how
each observation is a function of the previous p obser-
vations. For example, if p = 1, then each observation
is a function of only one previous observation. That is,
y(n) = a0 + a1y(n − 1) + w(n) where y(n) represents
the observed value at n, y(n−1) represents the previous
observed value at n − 1, w(n) represents some random
error and a0 and a1 are both constants. Other observed
values of the series can be included in the right-hand side
of the equation if p > 1:
y(n) = a0+a1y(n−1)+ . . .+apy(n−p)+w(n). (1)
• Integrated. This part of the model determines whether
the observed values are modeled directly, or whether the
differences between consecutive observations are mod-
eled instead. If d = 0, the observations are modeled
directly. If d = 1, the differences between consecutive
observations are modeled. If d = 2, the differences of
the differences are modeled. In practice, d is rarely more
than 2.
In this sense, the integrated contribution allows to capture
the nonstationarity part of the moments of the stochas-
tic process. If after differencing, a series is stationary,
then the series is called integrated of order one and is
denoted I(1). If, however, the series is not stationary
after differencing once, then we might need to take a
second difference. If the series becomes stationary after
the second difference then it is said to be integrated of
order two and is denoted I(2), and so on. That is a non-
stationary process is integrated of order d if we need
to difference it d times to induce stationary and it is
denoted I(d). Although the integrated component can be
considered within the AR component by its formulation,
its synthesis depends on different factors. Thus, the
integrated component also shows the dependence with
past values of the series but its synthesis depends on the
nonstationary moments of the process. The order d of
the integrated component is fixed by the order of the
highest nonstationary moment of the stochastic process.
In general, the integrated component can be expressed:
s(n) = c1s(n− 1) + ...+ cds(n− d) + w(n), (2)
where:
ci =
(
d
i
)
(−1)i+1 i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d}. (3)
For example, a process whose mean is nonstationary and
the rest of high order moments are stationaries would
have an integrated component of order 1. This integrated
process is the so-called ”random walk”.
• Moving Average: This part of the model describes how
each observation is a function of the previous q errors.
For example, if q = 1, then each observation is a function
of only one previous error. In general,
x(n) = b0w(n) + b1w(n− 1) + ...+ bqw(n− q), (4)
where the terms bi are constant coefficients. Here w(n)
represents the random error at n and w(n− q) represents
the previous random error at n− q.
III. PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS
Our preliminary analysis is focused on the study of the
revocation codes. Our goal is to find whether it is possible,
using this parameter, to get some insights about how the
revocation process works in the real world. The real world
data that we consider are from the three main CAs: VeriSign,
GoDaddy and Entrust.
The PKIX/X.509 certificate and CRL specification [13]
defines nine reason codes for revocation of a public-key
certificate:
(1) keyCompromise
(2) cACompromise
(3) affiliationChanged
(4) superseded
(5) cessationOfOperation
(6) certificateHold
(7) removeFromCRL
(8) privilegeWithdrawn
(9) aACompromise
Reason codes can be included as non-critical extensions
within the CSI, for instance, in an extension of a CRL. As
mentioned, the standard [13] defines the possible revocation
reasons and how to include them within the status data but
it does not define which should be the revocation practice
for each code. As a result, we will see that in practice,
revocation reasons are poorly utilized or even ignored by
most of the CAs. To illustrate this, let us consider the case
of code-signing certificates. For these certificates, VeriSign,
which is the overall leading CA in the marketplace, does not
provide any information about the revocation reason2. On the
other hand, certificates from the GoDaddy CA use almost
always the same revocation reason. In particular, they use the
reason number (5) cessationOfOperation like a kind
of “default” reason for most of the revoked certificates. This
is shown in Figure 1, in which we covered more than 600,000
certificates from GoDaddy.
To extend the results, we analyze the revocation causes
available for 20,000 revoked certificates issued by En-
trust. Figure 2 shows the probability of each revocation
cause. In this case, the main reason for a certificate to
be revoked is superseding (cause (4)) followed by
cessationOfOperation (cause (5)). Notice that consid-
ering these two causes, we cover around the 92% of the
revoked certificates.
2Actually, VeriSign does not provide revocation causes for any of its issued
certificates.
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Fig. 1: Revocation causes of code-signing certificates issued
by GoDaddy.
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Fig. 2: Revocation causes of code-signing certificates issued
by Entrust.
The rough analysis performed and the discussion presented
evidences that the revocation causes available from the real
world do not provide information which we can use to build
a rigorous revocation model to predict when or how many
revocations are prone to happen. CAs from the real world do
not follow any clear guideline about how to use this optional
parameter. Versign, the certification market leader, does not
provide revocation codes within their CRLs (this might be
related with privacy issues), while other CAs like GoDaddy
and Entrust use revocation causes in different ways and with
a different distribution.
Taking these facts into consideration, in the rest of the
paper we build a revocation model which is exclusively based
on temporal information, namely revocation dates and the
life-time of certificates. These parameters are well-defined,
compulsory and they will allow us to build a model that will
show that certificate revocations are closely related with time.
IV. DATA COLLECTION AND PREPROCESSING
To analyze the time evolution of the certificate revocation
process, we need information about the revoked certificates.
To obtain as much information as possible we gathered a
large sample of revoked certificates. Those certificates were
collected using VeriSign’s Certificate Revocation Lists [20].
We choose VeriSign because it is the only certification au-
thority that provides information about the lifetime of the
revoked certificates. This information is crucial to develop
our prediction model about the percentage of revoked cer-
tificates. VeriSign’s competitors (e.g. Godaddy or Entrust) do
not publicize information about the lifetime of the revoked
certificates. Moreover, VeriSign is the trusted provider of
Internet infrastructure services for the networked world that
leads the global SSL marketplace with a 47.52% share [12].
Therefore, though the data collected belongs exclusively to
a single certification authority, the model is expected to be
useful for any other CA as the data covers almost half of the
global marketplace.
For the purpose of this paper, we consider the two main
types of certificates (see Table I for details): certificates for
SSL servers and code-signing certificates. Accordingly, we
also use two different types of CRL files from VeriSign web-
site and from these CRLs we obtain the following parameters:
• Last Update instant of the CRL.
• Next Update instant of the CRL.
• Serial Number of each revoked certificate.
• Revocation Date of each revoked certificate.
It is worth to mention that typically, a revoked and expired
certificate remains in the CRL for one additional CRL publi-
cation interval. However, due to VeriSign certification practice
statement, certificates from VeriSign’s CRLs are removed after
they expire. Therefore, the collected dataset covers only non-
expired revoked certificates. On the other hand, our goal is
to perform a time series analysis of the percentage of weekly
revoked certificates. That is to say, for each week, we want
to compute the ratio between the number of certificates that
are going to be revoked during the week over the number
of certificates that are valid at the end of the week. Valid
certificates are those certificates which are non-expired and
non-revoked. Since the amount of valid certificates at each
moment is not publicly made available by VeriSign, we cannot
directly calculate this ratio. However, we can use an indirect
strategy to calculate a proportional ratio following the same
procedure as in [8], [9], [10]. The idea is to obtain a subset
of valid certificates for considered weeks proportional to the
full set of valid certificates. To do so, for each certificate that
is in our data set (the set of collected CRLs) we obtain its
serial number, its revocation date and its issuance date (this
last parameter is not present in CRLs but we can obtain it
through the VeriSign web interface using the serial numbers of
certificates). Notice that with this information from our dataset,
we are able to compute a subset of valid certificates for the
considered week, that is, certificates that were issued before
the considered week and that will be revoked beyond the
considered week. We can name this subset of valid certificates
for each week as to-be-revoked valid certificates. Figure 4
shows the different sets of certificates according to their status
for any given week.
revoked 
certificates
to-be-revoked 
certificates
valid 
certificates
Issued 
non-expired 
certificates
Fig. 4: Sets of certificates according to their status.
For the rest of the paper, we will simply refer to the “weekly
percentage of revoked certificates” as the ratio between the
5File Name # Certificates CA Name Description
VeriSign International Server CA Class 3 19.345 VeriSign International Server CA Class 3 Issues Global Server SGC certificates.
Class3Code-Signing2001 1.996 VeriSign Class 3 Code Signing 2001 CA Legacy issuer of Code Signing certificates. Is-
sues code signing and object signing certificates
for use with Netscape browsers, Microsoft In-
ternet Explorer browsers, Microsoft Office, Sun
Java Signing, Macromedia, and Marimba.
TABLE I: Description of the collected CRLs.
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(b) Code-signing certificates
Fig. 3: Weekly percentage of revoked certificates evolution
set of certificates that are going to be revoked during the
considered week over the set of to-be-revoked valid certificates
for this week. Notice that this method does not compromise the
validity of our model since we are interested in modeling the
revocation pattern and its statistical properties. To get absolute
values, just a change of scale is needed. Figure 3 shows a plot
of the weekly revocation percentages for SSL and code-signing
certificates that we computed with the available data from
VeriSign. Now, we build a single time series by concatenating
the time-series of Figure 3 to obtain general statistical prop-
erties (the result of this concatenation is plotted in Figure 5).
Analyzing the statistical properties of the concatenated time-
series we observe that:
• On average, we observe that the ratio of the percentage
of revoked certificates is approximately 2%.
• As we have approximated the valid certificates by the
number of valid certificates to be revoked, this means
that less than 2% of the issued certificates are revoked
weekly.
• The percentage of weekly revoked certificates exhibits a
highly variable behavior.
• The standard deviation of the percentage of revoked
certificates is almost 75% of the mean (µ = 0.0245,
σ = 0.0183).
Following the probability analysis performed in some pre-
vious works ([8] and [9]), we also try to fit the probability
density function (pdf) of the concatenated time-series of Fig-
ure 5 to an exponential distribution. As in the previous works,
we also find that the empirical data, while not exactly, roughly
follow an exponential distribution (see Figure 6). Fairly similar
results were obtained in [8], [9]. This is remarkable since the
mentioned previous works use datasets with different temporal
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Fig. 6: Empirical data vs. fitted exponential PDF.
ranges. This gives us the intuition that the revocation process
follows some type of temporal pattern no matter which is the
dataset used. Following this intuition, in the next section we
follow a novel approach for modeling the revocation process
which has not been explored by any other previous work. Our
approach consists in analyzing the concatenated time-series of
the weekly percentage of revoked certificates by means of an
ARIMA process. Following this technique, we obtain a single
model that predicts extremely well the weekly revocation
percentage of both SSL and code-signing certificates. Finally,
the outstanding behavior of our predictions will be asserted
by applying different tests over the developed model.
V. MODELING THE REVOCATION
In this section we develop a new model for the percentage
of revoked certificates. Our model might be interesting for
several reasons: on one hand, it provides some insights about
the revocation process. On the other hand, it allows CAs to
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Fig. 5: Concatenated time-series.
make predictions about certificate revocation which might be
useful in some scenarios (see Section VII).
So, we want to obtain a model from the revocation time-
series to obtain a suitable model for revocation forecasting.
For this purpose, one of the simplest techniques is to use
a Multiple Linear Regression (MLR). Linear regression is
useful for exploring the relationship of an independent vari-
able to a dependent variable when the relationship is linear.
However, MLR has drawbacks when the time-series exhibits
high correlation. Correlation means that the value of the
considered parameter at one time is influenced by values
of the parameter at previous times. This happens when the
values of the dependent variable over time are not randomly
distributed. In our case, we will find that for the time-series
of the revocation percentage, the error residuals are correlated
with their own lagged values. This serial correlation violates
the standard assumption of regression theory that disturbances
are not correlated with other disturbances. If there are lagged
dependent variables set as the regressors, regression estimates
are biased and inconsistent. Fortunately, this can be fixed
using an Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average Model
(ARIMA). Thus, as we have found that the simplest analysis,
the MLR, is not suitable to develop our forecasting model, we
will use the more complete ARIMA.
To do so, in the rest of the section we first we describe each
of the component of the ARIMA process in the Z-domain.
Then, we characterize the ARIMA model that best fits the
revocation process. That is, we calculate the coefficients of the
different ARIMA components to fit the collected revocation
data. As we will show, these coefficients will allow to build a
suitable predictor to forecast revocations.
A. ARIMA processes in the Z-domain
In section II-B we have described ARIMA processes in
the time-domain. However, as any linear system, an ARIMA
process can be expressed by a difference equation involving
the input series and the output series. If we Z-transform
the difference equation, and reorganize the equation we can
compute what is called the transfer function of the system.
This function completely defines the behavior of a the linear
system and makes it easier its management.
In this sense we use the delay operator z−1 [21] to Z-
transform the time-domain expression of an ARIMA(p, d, q)
process. To that end, we Z-transform the autoregressive com-
ponent, moving average component and the integrated com-
ponent. In Figure 7 a scheme of the ARIMA model is shown.
Note that, as it is shown in the figure, we can express the
transfer function of the ARIMA(p, d, q) process as a cascade
of all three components.
A-1(z) B(z)C(z)
w(n)s(n) x(n)y(n)
Fig. 7: Components of an ARIMA process.
First we Z-transform the moving average component. A
MA(q) stochastic process is one that is generated using the
difference equation expressed in (4). Applying the Z-transform
to equation (4) we can express the MA process in the z-domain
as:
B(z) = b0 + b1z
−1 + b2z−2...+ bqz−q. (5)
Note that it only uses previous samples of the input signal.
The main features of the associated generating system are that
it is Linear time-invariant (LTI), causal and stable. The MA
system is Finite Impulse Response (FIR) and, therefore, an
all-zero system. In this sense, Figure 8 represents the MA(q)
as a FIR filter whose transfer function is B(z):
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Fig. 8: MA filter.
An AR(p) stochastic process is one that is generated using
the difference equation expressed in (1). This is a quite general
situation in which it is reasonable to think that a given sample
of a time-series depends linearly on previous samples plus
some random error. In this sense, the transfer function of
AR(p) process in the z-domain is express as:
7A(z) = 1 + a1z
−1 + a2z−2...+ apz−p. (6)
The impulse response of the associated system is Infinite
Impulse Response (IIR) and its transfer function is of the kind
all-pole. Note that, this time, the autocorrelation is not limited
and it tends to 0 when the lag tends to infinity, only if the
module of all its poles is strictly smaller than 1. That means
that if this condition is met, then the AR(p) process is ergodic.
Figure 9 represents the AR(q) as an IIR filter whose transfer
function is A(z):
1 2
1 2
1
1 ... ppa z a z a z
    
( )x n
1
( ) ( ) ( )
p
k
k
y n w n a y n k

  
Fig. 9: AR filter.
Finally, we can also express integrated component in the
z-domain from equation (2):
C(z) = (1− z−1)−d. (7)
In the same way as the autoregressive and moving average
components of the ARIMA process, we can represent the
integrated component as a linear filter. Figure 10 represents
the I(d) as a linear filter whose transfer function is C(z):
1(1 )
1
dz
( )y n
1
( ) (n) ( )
d
k
k
s n w c s n k

  
Fig. 10: Integrated filter.
Finally, the general expression of an ARIMA(p, d, q) pro-
cess can be expressed by its Z-transform as:
S(z) = [B(z)A(z)C(z)] ·W (z). (8)
Understanding expression (8) as the relationship between
the input w(n) and the output s(n) of a digital filter in a
given instant n, the transfer function of the filter H(z) could
be defined as:
H(z) =
S(z)
W (z)
= B(z)A(z)C(z). (9)
It is worth noting that the factors of the transfer func-
tion follow the reverse order of the synthesis of the model.
However, the order of the system in the cascade can be
rearranged without affecting the characteristics of the overall
combination. Hence, it is equivalent to changing the order
by the commutative property for linear systems. Figure 11
represents the ARIMA filter with transfer function H(z):
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Fig. 11: ARIMA filter.
Note also that the roots of the polynomial B(z) correspond
to the zeros of the filter and the zeros of A−1(z) and C−1(z)
to the poles. According to the definition of the ci values
expressed in (3), the integrated order defines the multiplicity
of the pole in z = 1. This pole generates the instability of
impulsional response. The rest of obtained poles (zk) will be
found in the unit circle (|zk| < 1) of the Z plane.
B. Characterization of the revocations as an ARIMA process
In this section, we show that the actual behavior of the
revocation process can be modeled as an ARIMA process. To
that end, a new ARIMA model for the revocations has been
developed to find the predictor. The steps we follow to model
the revocation process can be summarized as follows:
1) Testing for stationarity of the time series.
2) If the series is not stationary, transforming it to a
stationary series by differencing:
a) Estimating the degree of differencing.
b) Differencing the time series to obtain a stationary
series.
3) Identifying the ARMA components.
a) Estimating the order of the AR component and the
MA component from the stationary series.
b) Extracting the ARMA parameters.
4) Model fit validation using residual diagnostics
The result of carrying out these steps will be an ARIMA
model defined by:
• an order d that represents the number of nonseasonal
differences for the I component of the process.
• q coefficients that characterize the MA component of the
process.
• p coefficients that characterize the AR component of the
process.
Knowing these coefficients, any CA could use the ARIMA
model to predict which weeks are more prone to suffer from
revocation in a near future.
1) Model Identification:
The first step in developing the ARIMA model is to deter-
mine if the series is stationary and if there is any significant
seasonality that needs to be modeled. In the following we show
that the global revocation time series is nonstationary and does
not present a seasonal pattern. The aim of this first step is to
calculate the order of differencing d to achieve stationarity.
Once we have obtained a stationary time series we will be
able to model it as an ARMA process.
First of all, we start testing for stationarity. To test station-
arity, first we analyzed the Autocorrelation Function (ACF)
of the percentage of revoked certificates (see Figure 12). We
can observe that the actual time series follows certain trend,
so the time series is nonstationary. The temporal series of the
percentage of revoked certificates presents a slow variation of
the mean. To confirm this visual evaluation, we perform a
KPSS test [22] at the 99% confidence level which rejects the
null hypothesis of stationarity.
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Fig. 12: ACF of the percentage of revoked certificates.
Once we have confirmed that the time series is nonsta-
tionary, we have to find the integrated component. The long
range dependence complicates the development of a predictor
because the temporal series shows an apparent non stationary
mean. To synthesize a good predictor it is necessary to capture
this long term effect. The long term dependence produces that
the mean varies. This variation reaches maximum and mini-
mum levels which are very distant (see Figure 13). However,
the variance remains almost constant. This allows to conclude
that the integrated component of the model should be of order
1 and its associated transfer function C(z) = (1− z−1)−1.
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Fig. 13: PDF of the extracted integrated component time
series.
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Fig. 14: ACF of the extracted integrated component time
series.
Next, it is necessary to extract the integrated component
of the actual process s(n) to determine which are the values
of the AR and MA components. According to the scheme
presented in Figure 7 the residual ARMA series y(n) and the
real series s(n) are related as follows:
Y (z) =
1
C(z)
S(z) =
(
1− z−1)S(z). (10)
In this way, the temporal series y(n) will be obtained at
the output of the FIR (Finite Impulse Response) filter, whose
transfer function is (1 − z−1), when it is excited with the
temporal series generated by the coder. It can be checked
that the temporal series y(n) is a stochastic process with
mean 0 and an invariant autocorrelation coefficients. This
statistical analysis has been carried out with the data gathered
from VeriSign and with autocorrelation lags of 100 units. The
probability distribution function fits a Gaussian distribution.
At this point we have to check whether the time series
without the integrated component is white noise or not. We
check (at a confidence level of 99% and 70 lags) that y(n) is
not white noise by means of Ljung-Box Q-test [11]. The visual
analysis of the autocorrelation of y(n) confirms the result of
this test (see Figure 14). The fact that y(n) is not white noise
allows us to model it be means of an ARMA process.
2) Estimation of the ARMA coefficients:
In this section, we determine the best ARMA model that fits
y(n). To that end, first we estimate the number of coefficients
needed to capture the autoregressive component of the process.
Then, we calculate the value of these coefficients. Once we
have modeled the AR(p) component, we estimate the number
of coefficients that model the moving average component
of the process. Finally, we calculate the values of the MA
coefficients.
It must be noted that we use the Bayesian Information
Criterion (BIC) [11] for model selection among the different
set of ARMA models with different numbers of parameters.
That information criterion penalizes models with additional
parameters. Therefore, the BIC model order selection criteria
are based on parsimony. Along with the BIC criterion we
also try to minimize the correlation of the residuals. Using
these criteria, the order of the AR process found is 10. Once
the order the AR process has been determined, we use Least
Squares estimation to calculate the coefficients of the AR
component.
A(z) = 1 + 1.642z−1 + 0.9225z−2 + 0.7091z−3 + 0.3704z−4
− 0.7782z−5 − 0.9453z−6 − 0.5768z−7 − 0.3449z−8
+ 0.01871z−9 + 0.1073z−10. (11)
The MA component can be analyzed when the AR com-
ponent of the y(n) series is withdrawn. Applying the above
explained technique for the integrative component the x(n)
series can be derived using the relation between the y(n) and
x(n) series:
X(z) = A(z)Y (z) = (1 + 1.642z−1 + 0.9225z−2 + 0.7091z−3
+ 0.3704z−4 − 0.7782z−5 − 0.9453z−6 − 0.5768z−7
− 0.3449z−8 + 0.01871z−9 + 0.1073z−10)Y (z).
(12)
Using a FIR filter with transfer function A−1(z) the series
x(n) can be obtained at the output of this filter when y(n)
is applied at the input. To estimate the parameters of the MA
process, least square estimation is applied to fit the partial
autocovariance function of x(n) [11]. We use the same criteria
as in the AR process for selecting the parameters of the MA
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Fig. 15: ARIMA Predictor.
i 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
a′i – 0.6417 -0.7192 -0.2134 -0.3387 -1.149 -0.1671 0.3685 0.2319 0.3636 0.08859 -0.1073
bi 1 -0.3558 0.6139 0.09758 -0.7464 0.1897 -0.7705
TABLE II: Coefficients of the ARIMA predictor.
process. The best adjustment is obtained with a MA process
with order 6.
B(z) = 1− 0.3558z−1 + 0.6139z−2 + 0.09758z−3
− 0.7464z−4 + 0.1897z−5 − 0.7705z−6. (13)
As the integrated component of the obtained model has
order 1, the integrated and the autoregressive components can
be written together in the following way:
A′(z) = A(z)C(z) = A(z)
(
1− z−1) . (14)
Therefore, the generated series can be expressed as:
s(n) = b0w(n) + · · ·+ bqw(n− q)
+ a′1s(n− 1) + · · ·+ a′p+1s(n− p− 1), (15)
where the coefficients are obtained applying the inverse Z
transform to A′(z), that is:
A′(z) = 1 + 0.6417z−1 − 0.7192z−2 − 0.2134z−3
− 0.3387z−4 − 1.149z−5 − 0.1671z−6 + 0.3685z−7
+ 0.2319z−8 + 0.3636z−9 + 0.08859z−10
− 0.1073z−11. (16)
3) Model Diagnostic Checking:
Finally, to check that the model is not misspecified, we
run again the Ljung-Box Q-test at a confidence level of 99%
and 70 lags. The test results in the acceptance of the null
hypothesis that the model fit is adequate (no serial correlation
at the corresponding element of lags).
VI. REVOCATION FORECASTING
Once we have developed an ARIMA model for the time-
series of the weekly revocation percentage, in this section we
use this model to build an ARIMA predictor. Then, we check
the goodness of the predictions for the concatenated revocation
time-series and also for each type of certificate.
First, we start by obtaining an expression of the residual
series to check whether it follows a Gaussian distribution or
not. From (15), the (n+ 1) sample prediction is:
sˆ(n+ 1) = b0wˆ(n+ 1) + · · ·+ bqw(n− q + 1)
+ a′1s(n) + · · ·+ a′p+1s(n− p). (17)
Nevertheless, in the prediction context the values of the
w(n) series must be figured out. The predictor will have only
the previous values of the s(n) series. Moreover, the wˆ(n+1)
is a future value. The forecast value of wˆ(n + 1) will be the
mean value of the w(n) series. In this case, the mean value is
0. Thus, the (n+ 1) sample prediction can be simplified as:
sˆ(n+ 1) = b1w(n) + · · ·+ bqw(n− q + 1)
+ a′1s(n) + · · ·+ a′p+1s(n− p). (18)
To determine w(n) as a function of s(n), we conduct some
algebraic manipulations. From (15), it is also possible to write:
sˆ(n) = b0wˆ(n− 1) + · · ·+ bqw(n− q)
+ a′1s(n− 1) + · · ·+ a′p+1s(n− p− 1). (19)
Subtracting (19) to (15):
s(n)− sˆ(n) = b0(w(n)− wˆ(n)). (20)
As it has been mentioned, the forecast value of wˆ(n) will
be 0, so:
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s(n)− sˆ(n) = b0w(n). (21)
Therefore:
w(n) =
s(n)− sˆ(n)
b0
. (22)
To evaluate the behavior of the above transfer function,
an analysis of the forecast errors has been done. Figure 16
presents the residuals autocorrelation and the 99% confidence
intervals. The residual diagnostic determines that the forecast
errors are clearly uncorrelated.
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Fig. 16: Autocorrelation function of the forecast errors using
the ARIMA predictor.
Figure 17 presents the CDF of the residuals autocorrelation
and the CDF of standard Gaussian distribution with its 99%
confidence intervals. Notice that the residuals are close to the
Gaussian distribution. As it is shown below, the estimated
ARIMA model is appropriate for forecasting. Therefore, the
ARIMA model fits well the behavior of the revocations.
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Fig. 17: CDF of the ARIMA prediction residuals.
Once we have seen that the residuals are quite close to
the Gaussian distribution, we obtain an expression for the ”1
ahead“ prediction. Replacing this expression in the equation
(18), the (n+ 1) sample prediction can be written as:
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Fig. 18: ACF of the residual series for SGC certificates
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Fig. 19: ACF of the residual series for Code-signing certifi-
cates
sˆ(n+ 1) =
1
b0
[b1(s(n)− sˆ(n)) + b2(s(n− 1)− sˆ(n− 1))
+ · · ·+ bq(s(n− q + 1)− sˆ(n− q + 1))]
+ a′1s(n) + · · ·+ a′p+1s(n− p). (23)
From this expression, we can plot the derived ARIMA
predictor using the coefficients obtained in the previous section
(see Figure 15). The predictor supplies the estimated value for
the (n+1) sample as a function of the n previous ones. This
set of samples can be used also to obtain a prediction of the
samples “2 ahead”, “3 ahead”, etc. Running the predictor with
the (n+ j) sample estimation, it supplies an estimated value
of the (n+ j + 1) sample.
Finally, to check that the model is not misspecified, we
run again the Ljung-Box Q-test at a confidence level of 99%
and 70 lags. The test results in the acceptance of the null
hypothesis that the model fit is adequate (no serial correlation
at the corresponding element of lags).
Once we have seen that the model fits quite accurately
the global revocation process, we must check its suitability
for each type of certificate. For this purpose, we analyze the
residuals for individual revocation processes using the ARIMA
model obtained from the global series. Figures 18 and 19
present the residuals autocorrelation and the 99% confidence
intervals for each type of certificates. Note that there is no
residual that exceeds the confidence intervals. Therefore, we
can conclude that the ARIMA model developed from the
concatenated time-series captures the revocation pattern of
both certificate types.
Finally, in figures 20 and 21 the “1 ahead“, ”2 ahead“ and ”3
ahead“ predictions are presented for the percentage of revoked
certificates. It is evidenced from the figure that one-step ahead
out-sample forecasts follow the actual revocation data more
closely than k-step ahead out-sample forecasts. As expected,
the k-step ahead out-sample forecasts accumulate the error
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Fig. 20: Predictions for SGC certificates.
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Fig. 21: Predictions for code-signing certificates.
terms resulting in low accuracy in forecasting performances.
Again, the predictions are valid for both certificate type,
corroborating the results obtained from the residual analysis.
VII. SOME APPLICATIONS OF REVOCATION FORECASTING
In this section, we briefly describe some possible scenarios
in which revocation forecasting might be useful. However, a
detailed study of all the possible applications of revocation
forecasting is beyond the scope of this paper.
The first quite straightforward application of revocation
forecasting is to use it to set the validity period of the CRLs.
More precisely, the validity period of the CRLs could be set
as a function of the predicted revocation percentage. In this
way, the CA could issue CRLs with short validity periods if the
predictor forecasts many revocations, and viceversa. In a wired
network, this might seem a subtle enhancement since there
is always the possibility of issuing CRLs with small validity
periods. As in wired networks, bandwidth is not scarce and
connections are stable, the risk of operating with a revoked
certificate can be made fairly small by frequently issuing
CRLs. However, this is not the case of some new communica-
tion paradigms like Delay and Disruption Tolerant Networks
(DTN). In a DTN, applications must opportunistically exploit
connectivity over intermittent links [23]. Regarding security,
one of the main challenges in DTNs is how to create and
distribute keys and credentials. To this respect, many authors
[24], [25] and the current security draft specification for DTN
[26] agree that the most promising solution is to use public-
key cryptography with digital certificates.
An example of this paradigm are vehicular communications
(VANET) in which vehicles might not be always connected to
the infrastructure (Internet). In this case, PKI users (vehicles)
might not dispose of the latest CRL available. The question
is whether to operate or not with a certificate that might be
revoked, considering that the only information that we have
is an obsolete CRL. Obviously, if the CRL is old, the risk
is higher than if it is recent. The problem is to distinguish
between what is old and what is recent. For instance, let us
consider that a PKI user has a copy of a CRL which was
issued a couple of hours ago. Two hours may not be considered
a long time if the revocation percentage is around 10−5 but
this interval can be considered quite long if we are going to
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have a 10% of revoked certificates during the next two hours.
Here, the forecasting mechanism could be used to properly set
the time-stamps (validity periods) of the CRLs so that they
provide the user with an idea about how revocation process
is behaving and thus, how risky is operating with other users’
certificates. Furthermore, if a more precise criterion is desired,
the CA could include the parameters of the forecasting model
inside the CRL in one of the so-called extension fields. In this
way, PKI users might use predictions to evaluate the risk of
operating with other user’s certificates when connection to the
infrastructure is not available.
Another type of scenario in which revocation forecasting
can be applied is dynamic delegation [27], [28], [29]. Dynamic
delegation is devised for highly distributed scenarios like
Web Services [30]. In these scenarios users delegate certain
credentials or attributes to perform a certain task by issuing
certificates. In this context, some authors propose to use short-
lived certificates avoiding the need of a revocation system.
However, if we use a short-lived certificate to perform some
tasks and the validity period of the certificate is lower than
the one required by the task, we will need to contact the
certification authority to get a new certificate to finish the
task. This is a problem mainly in long-term jobs [31]. For this
reason, the GT4 group of the Globus consortium considers
that a good option for these long-term jobs is to use long-
lived certificates and a revocation mechanism [32]. In this
scenario, a revocation forecasting model could be useful to
set the validity period of the certificates and/or its associated
CRLs.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
We have analyzed real empirical data to derive a model
which allows to forecast the percentage of revocations in the
near future. Our research represents a step towards linking
empirical observations to mathematical models in description
of the complex issue of certificate revocation.
This paper has proposed an ARIMA model for short-
range forecasting in a certificate status information distribution
system. The ARIMA model completely considers the dynamic
process of data series and the autocorrelation of residuals
to achieve precise forecasting of the percentage of revoked
certificates.
We used the Box-Jenkins methodology as a framework
for our modeling procedure and we built the best ARIMA
model possible for the available data. The model exhibits great
accuracy for both short (a few weeks) and long (a few months)
time scales.
Although the collected revocation data only belong to the
leading certification authority the model is expected to be valid
for other certification providers because of the huge amount
of certificates analyzed and because our model captures the
general pattern of the temporal correlation that exists among
the revocation events. This pattern is expected to be the
same for other CAs because the theoretical reasons to revoke
certificates (and therefore the temporal correlation) do not
essentially differ, no matter which certificate provider you use.
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